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Abstract: Software-defined networking (SDN) is a new paradigm that allows developing more flexible network applications. 
SDN controller, which represents a centralized controlling point, is responsible for running various network applications as 
well as maintaining different network services and functionalities. Choosing an efficient intrusion detection system helps in 
reducing the overhead of the running controller and creates a more secure network. In this study, we investigate the 
performance of the well-known anomaly-based intrusion detection approaches in terms of accuracy, false alarm rate, 
precision, recall, f1-measure, area under ROC curve, execution time and Mc Nemar’s test. Precisely, we focus on supervised 
machine-learning approaches where we use the following classifiers: Decision Trees (DT), Extreme Learning Machine (ELM), 
Naive Bayes (NB), Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA), Neural Networks (NN), Support Vector Machines (SVM), Random Forest 
(RT), K Nearest-Neighbour (KNN), AdaBoost, RUSBoost, LogitBoost and BaggingTrees where we employ the well-known NSL-
KDD benchmark dataset to compare the performance of each one of these classifiers.  
 
1. Introduction 
Network security is one of the most important aspects in 
modern communications. Recently, programmable networks 
have gained popularity due to their abstracted view of the 
network which, in turn, provides a better understanding of the 
complex network operations and increases the effectiveness 
of the actions that should be taken in the case of any potential 
threat. Software Defined Networking (SDN) represents an 
emerging centralized network architecture, in which the 
forwarding elements are being managed by a central unit, 
called an SDN controller, which has the ability to obtain 
traffic statistics from each forwarding element in order to take 
the appropriate action required for preventing any malicious 
behavior or abusing of the network. At the same time, the 
SDN controller uses a programmable network protocol, 
which is OpenFlow (OF) protocol, in order to communicate 
and forward its decisions to OF-enabled switches [1].  
 
In spite of the significant impact of using a centralized 
controller, the controller itself creates a single point of failure, 
which makes the network more vulnerable compared with the 
conventional network architecture [2]. On the other hand, the 
existence of a communication between the OF-enabled 
switches and the controller opens the door for various attacks 
such Denial of Service (DoS) [3], Host Location Hijacking 
and Man in the Middle (MIM) attacks [4]. Therefore, in order 
to develop an efficient Intrusion Detection System (IDS) for 
SDNs, the system should be able to make intelligent and real 
time decisions. Commonly, an IDS designed for SDNs works 
on the top of the controller, which forms an additional burden 
on the controller itself. Thus, designing a lightweight IDS is 
considered advantageous, since it helps in effectively 
detecting of any potential attacks as well as performing other 
fundamental network operations such as routing and load 
balancing in a more flexible manner. Scalability, is also an 
important factor, which should be taken into consideration 
during the designing stage of the system [4]. There are two 
main groups of intrusion detection systems: signature-based 
IDS and anomaly-based IDS. Signature-based IDS searches 
for defined patterns within the analyzed network traffic. On 
the other hand, an anomaly-based IDS can estimate and 
predict the behavior of system. A signature-based IDS shows 
a good performance only for specified well-known attacks. 
On the contrary, anomaly-based IDS enjoys ability to detect 
unseen intrusion events, which is an important advantage for 
detecting zero day attacks [5].  
Anomaly-based IDS can be grouped into three main 
categories [5]: statistical-based approaches, knowledge-
based approaches, and machine learning-based approaches. 
In this study, we focus on machine learning-based approaches. 
Machine learning techniques can be categorized into four 
categories: (i) supervised techniques, (ii) semi-supervised 
techniques, (iii) unsupervised techniques and (iv) 
reinforcement techniques. In this paper, we investigate 
various supervised learning techniques with respect to their 
accuracy, false alarm rate, precision, recall, f1-measure, area 
under ROC curve, Mc Nemar’s test and time taken to train 
and test each classifier. 
2. Related work 
Previous research efforts for providing a detailed 
analysis of supervised machine learning techniques used for 
intrusion detection are summarized in Table 1. These studies 
focused on training and testing different machine learning 
approaches using standard intrusion detection datasets. 
However, obtaining all these features from an SDN controller 
could be computationally expensive. Therefore, we have two 
possible choices: either using a subset of these standard 
datasets [6] or extracting new features based on network 
traces of standard datasets or statistics provided by the 
controller [7]. In this study, we use a subset of features 
extracted from NSL-KDD dataset based on employing the 
well-known Principal Components Analysis (PCA) approach 
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and considering the following supervised machine learning 
approaches: Decision Trees (DT), Extreme Learning 
Machine (ELM), Naive Bayes (NB), Linear Discriminant 
Analysis (LDA), Neural Networks (NN), Support Vector 
Machines (SVM), Random Forest (RT), Nearest-Neighbor 
(KNN), AdaBoost, RUSBoost, LogitBoost and BaggingTrees. 
As mentioned before, for performance measurement, we use 
accuracy, false alarm rate, precision, recall, f1-measure and 
area under ROC curve, as well as time taken to train and test 
each one of these classifiers. Furthermore, we use Mc 
Nemar’s test in order to statistically demonstrate that a 
significant increase has been achieved by an algorithm over 
the other one. 
Table 1 Overview of previous supervised machine learning 
studies for intrusion detection 
Ref. Year Algorithms Dataset 
[8] 2005 C 4.5 
K-nearest neighbor 
Multi-layer perceptron 
Regularized discriminant 
analysis 
Fisher linear discriminant 
Support vector machines 
KDD 
CUP’99 
[9] 2007 Decision Trees 
Random Forest 
Naive Bayes 
Gaussian classifier 
KDD 
CUP’99 
[10] 2009 J48 
Naive Bayes (NB) 
NB Tree 
Random Forest 
Random Tree 
Multi-layer perceptron (MLP) 
SVM 
NSL-KDD 
[11] 2010 Discriminative multinomial 
Naïve Bayes classifiers 
NSL-KDD 
[12] 
  
2013 Principal component analysis 
based feature selection, 
Genetic algorithm based 
detector generation, J48, NB, 
MLP, BF-Tree, NB- Tree, RF 
Tree. 
NSL-KDD 
[13] 2013 Correlation based feature 
selection and 
consistency based filtering, 
ADTree, C4.5, J48graft, 
LADTree, NBTree, 
RandomTree, RandomForest, 
REPTree 
NSL-KDD 
[14] 2013 J48, BayesNet, Logistic, SGD, 
IBK, JRip, PART, Random 
Forest,  
Random Tree and REPTree 
NSL-KDD 
[15] 2015 Neural Networks NSL-KDD 
[16] 2016 Logistic Regression 
Gaussian Naive Bayes 
SVM and Random Forest 
NSL-KDD 
3. Dataset  
As mentioned earlier, in this study we use NSL-KDD 
dataset. NSL-KDD is an improved version of KDD Cup99 
dataset, which suffers from huge number of redundant 
records [10]. Both KDD Cup99 and NSL-KDD datasets 
include the features shown in Table 2. It is worth mentioning 
that these features fall into four different categories as 
described in Table 3. 
Table 3 List of feature categories presented in NSL-KDD 
dataset 
Category Features 
Basic features F1,F2,F3,F4,F5,F6,F7,F8,F9,F10 
Content features F11,F12,F13,F14,F15,F16,F17,F18 
F19,F20,F21,F22 
Time-based features F23,F24,F25,F26,F27,F28,F29,F30,F31 
Host-based features F32,F33,F34,F35,F36,F37,F38,F39,F40 
F41 
 
As shown in Table 4, NSL-KDD includes a total of 39 
attacks where each one of them is classified into one of the 
following four categories (DoS, R2L, U2R, Probe). Moreover, 
a set of these attacks is introduced only in the testing set. 
These new attacks are indicated in bold font. 
 
Table 4 List of attacks presented in NSL-KDD dataset 
Attack category Attack name 
Denial of service 
(DoS) 
Apache2, Smurf, Neptune, Back, 
Teardrop, Pod, Land, Mailbomb, 
Processtable, UDPstorm 
Remote to local 
(R2L) 
WarezClient, Guess_Password, 
WarezMaster, Imap, Ftp_Write, Named, 
MultiHop, Phf, Spy, Sendmail, 
SnmpGetAttack, SnmpGuess, Worm, 
Xsnoop, Xlock 
User to root 
(U2R) 
Buffer_Overflow, Httptuneel, Rootkit, 
LoadModule, Perl, Xterm, Ps, SQLattack 
Probe Satan, Saint, Ipsweep, Portsweep, Nmap, 
Mscan 
In addition, Table 5 shows the distribution of the normal 
and attack records in NSL-KDD training and testing sets. 
Table 2 List of features of KDD Cup '99 dataset. 
F. # Feature 
name. 
F. # Feature 
name. 
F. # Feature 
name. 
F1 Duration F15 Su 
attempted 
F29 Same srv 
rate 
F2 Protocol type F16 Num root F30 Diff srv 
rate 
F3 Service F17 Num file 
creations 
F31 Srv diff 
host rate 
F4 Flag F18 Num 
shells 
F32 Dst host 
count 
F5 Source bytes F19 Num 
access 
files 
F33 Dst host 
srv count 
F6 Destination 
bytes 
F20 Num 
outbound 
cmds 
F34 Dst host 
same srv 
rate 
F7 Land F21 Is host 
login 
F35 Dst host 
diff srv 
rate 
F8 Wrong 
fragment 
F22 Is guest 
login 
F36 Dst host 
same src 
port rate 
F9 Urgent F23 Count F37 Dst host 
srv diff 
host rate 
F10 Hot F24 Srv count F38 Dst host 
serror rate 
F11 Number 
failed logins 
F25 Serror rate F39 Dst host 
srv serror 
rate 
F12 Logged in F26 Srv serror 
rate 
F40 Dst host 
rerror rate 
F13 Num 
compromised 
F27 Rerror rate F41 Dst host 
srv rerror 
rate 
F14 Root shell F28 Srv rerror 
rate 
F42 Class label 
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4. Feature Selection 
In order to increase the efficiency of SDN based intrusion 
detection systems we need to select the best features that can 
be used in SDN context. It is worth noting that the content 
features need to be omitted due to the fact that these features 
are complex to extract by a network based IDS [17]. 
Therefore, content features (i.e. F11 to F22) were excluded 
from the NSL-KDD dataset. For the remaining features we 
apply Principal Component Analysis (PCA) on the training 
set. PCA allow us to transform a large dataset into a new, 
smaller and uncorrelated one [18]. The standard approach of 
PCA can be summarized in the followıng 6 steps [19]: 
 Find the covariance matrix of the normalized d-
dimensional dataset. 
 Find the eigenvectors and eigenvalues of the 
covariance matrix. 
 Sort the eigenvalues in descending order. 
 Select the k eigenvectors that correspond to the k 
largest eigenvalues. 
 Construct the projection matrix from the k selected 
eigenvectors. 
 Transform the original dataset to obtain a new k-
dimensional feature space. 
 
In this study, we employ PCA in the following steps: 
 First, we extract the features with the largest 
coefficients from the principal components. 
 Second, we select the k eigenvectors that correspond 
to the k largest eigenvalues. 
 Third, we transform the original dataset with 
corresponding features using the projection matrix 
from the k selected eigenvectors. 
 Finally, we validate the performance of the selected 
features and corresponding k component by 
applying the decision tree approach on the training 
test. 
5. Evaluation Metrics 
The performance of each classifier is evaluated in terms of 
accuracy, False Alarm Rate (FAR), precision, recall, F1-
measure, Area Under ROC Curve (AUC), execution time and 
Mc Nemar’s test. A good IDS should achieve high level of 
accuracy, precision, recall and F1-measure with low false 
alarm rate. The accuracy is calculated by: 
)( FPFNTNTP
TNTP
Accuracy


  
 
(1) 
True Positives (TP) is the number of attack records correctly 
classified; True Negatives (TN) is the number of normal 
traffic records correctly classified; False Positives (FP) is the 
number of normal traffic records falsely classified and False 
Negatives (FN) is number of attack records instances falsely 
classified. False alarm rate is calculated by: 
FPTN
FP
RateAlarmFalse

  
 
(2) 
We also calculate the precision, recall and F1-measure for 
each classifier where precision is calculated by: 
FPTP
TP
ecision

Pr  
 
(3) 
Recall is also calculated by: 
FNTP
TP
call

Re  
 
(4) 
And F1-measure is calculated by: 
)Re(Pr
)Re(Pr
21
callecision
callecision
measureF


  
 
(5) 
In addition, we evaluate the performance of the 
previously selected classifiers based on their execution time 
as well as the analysis of the receiver operator characteristic 
(ROC) curve, where the area under curve (AUC) can be used 
to compare each classifier with another one. The higher AUC, 
the better IDS. One other important metric that can be used 
for comparing two algorithms is Mc Nemar’s test, which is a 
non-parametric pair-wise test shows that a statistically 
significant increase has been achieved by an algorithm over 
the other one. When z-value of Nemar’s Test > 1.96 (p-value 
is less than 0.05), the conclusion is that there is a significant 
difference between the two algorıthms. Z-score is used to 
show the confidence levels [22]. 
 
𝑧 =  
(|𝑁12 − 𝑁21|) − 1
√(𝑁12 + 𝑁21)
 
(6) 
𝑁12: represents the number of times when the first algorithm 
success in classification and other one fails. 
𝑁21 : represents the number of times when the second 
algorithm success in classification and the first one fails. 
6. Experimental Results 
The experiment is conducted on Intel i5 machine with 12 GB 
of RAM. As shown in Fig 1, we get the best results when 
selecting 9 of the top features that contribute to the all PCA’s 
components as input, which need to be transformed to less 
dimensional space of the corresponding components. 
 
Fig. 1. The level of accuracy obtained by using 
 top selected features 
Table 5 Distributions of attacks and normal records in 
NSL-KDD dataset 
Total 
Records 
Normal DoS R2L U2R Probe Total 
Records 
KDD 
Train 
125973 67343 45927 995 52 11656 
53.46% 36.46 0.79% 0.04% 9.25% 
KDD 
Test 
22544 9711 7458 2754 200 2421 
43.07% 33.08% 12.22% 0.89% 10.74% 
 
4 
 
These 9 selected features are: F27, F30, F5, F23, F8, F1, F2, 
F39, F3. Brief description of these features is provided in 
Table 6.   
Table 6 List of feature selected from NSL-KDD dataset 
Feature Description 
F27 Percentage of connections that have REJ errors 
F30 Percentage of connections to different services 
F5 Number of data bytes from source to destination 
F23 Number of connections to the same host as the current 
connection in the past two seconds 
F8 Number of wrong fragments 
F1 Duration of the connection in seconds 
F2 Connection protocol (tcp, udp, icmp) 
F39 Percentage of connections to the current host and 
serror rate specified service that have an S0 error 
F3 Destination port mapped to service 
 
Fig. 2, shows the level of accuracy achieved when using 
different number of principal components. The best results 
achieved with the first 10 components. 
 
Fig. 2. The level of accuracy obtained with different number 
of PCA’s principle components 
 
Table 7 shows the results obtained for both training and 
testing stages. In terms of accuracy level, the 
most accurate classifiers for the training stage are: DT, RF, 
BaggingTrees, RUSBoost and AdaBoost with a slight 
difference between them. For the testing stage, however, we 
notice that DT approach achieved the highest level of 
accuracy followed by AdaBoost, RUSBoost and 
BaggingTrees. One can observe that ensemble methods 
achieved a lower false positive rate compared to DT. 
 
Table 7 Detection accuracy and false alarm rate obtained 
after training and testing different supervised machine 
learning algorithms with 10 principle components 
 
Method 
Accuracy (%) False Alarm Rate (%) 
Training Testing Training Testing 
Naive Bayes 64.16 49.12 4.54 5.74 
LDA 72.37 70.32 9.98 3.76 
Linear SVM 91.04 81.40 9.21 5.92 
NN 92.15 74.23 4.54 6.38 
ELM 92.66 75.86 5.54 3.57 
KNN 98.14 82.31 1.92 3.53 
LogitBoost 98.95 84.85 0.94 2.83 
AdaBoost 99.03 87.16 1.03 3.68 
RUSBoost 99.19 85.57 0.96 3.59 
BaggingTrees 99.33 84.03 0.81 3.51 
RandomForest 99.70 80.13 0.29 3.49 
Decision Tree 99.70 88.74 0.31 3.99 
In terms of false alarm rate, it is worth mentioning that 
LogitBoost approach achieved the best results. Therefore, one 
can conclude that ensemble methods such AdaBoost and 
LogitBoost can achieve a good accuracy with low false 
positive rate.  
 
From both Table 7 and Table 8, one can observe that 
using PCA feature selection enhanced the accuracy level for 
most of the classifiers in compared with using the basic 
features provided by the SDN controller (F1, F2, F5, F6, F23 
and F24). In terms of area under ROC curve, as shown in Fig. 
3 (a), we notice that DT and RF approaches achieved the best 
AUC for the training task followed by BaggingTrees, 
RUSBoost, AdaBoost and LogitBoost with slight difference 
between each other. Both NN and SVM had nearly the same 
AUC for the training task. NB, however, achieved the least 
training AUC.  
 
Table 8 Detection accuracy and false alarm rate obtained 
after training and testing different supervised machine 
learning algorithms based on basic features provided by the 
SDN controller (i.e. features number F1, F2, F5, F6, F23 and 
F24). 
 
Method 
Accuracy (%) False Positive Rate (%) 
Training Testing Training Testing 
Naive Bayes 59.27 49.88 3.7227 5.14 
LDA 87.57 69.36 3.26 2.24 
SVM 90.86 71.00 6.55 10.27 
NN 84.10 66.22 2.41 1.61 
ELM 93.16 74.17 2.25 2.31 
KNN 98.23 77.09 3.128 4.07 
RandomForest 98.09 75.96 0 0 
Decision Trees 98.37 74.43 0.306 6.43 
LogitBoost 99.38 79.44 0.43 2.75 
BaggingTrees 99.54 79.16 0.47 3.26 
AdaBoost 99.56 78.94 0.384 2.76 
RUSBoost 99.68 80.31 0.29 3.48 
     
For the testing task, as shown in Fig. 3(b), one can 
observe that the best AUC obtained by DT followed by 
AdaBoost, RUSBoost, LogitBoost and BaggingTrees. KNN 
achieved a better AUC than SVM and RF. In the same context, 
we notice that SVM also achieved a higher AUC than ELM 
approach. In terms of precision and F1-measure the best 
results were achieved by DT, whereas LogitBoost achieved 
the best results in terms of recall. 
 
Table 9 Precision, Recall, F1-measure obtained after training 
and testing different supervised machine learning algorithms 
with 10 principle components 
Method Precision 
(%) 
Recall 
(%) 
F1-measure  
(%) 
Naive Bayes 14.95 77.49 25.06 
LDA 50.7 94.69 66.07 
Linear SVM 71.81 94.13 81.47 
NN 59.56 92.5 72.46 
ELM 60.29 85.71 73.98 
KNN 71.59 96.41 82.17 
LogitBoost 75.53 97.24 85.03 
AdaBoost 80.23 96.65 87.67 
RUSBoost 77.41 96.6 85.95 
BaggingTrees 74.61 96.56 84.17 
RandomForest 67.73 96.25 80.13 
Decision Tree 83.24 96.50 89.38 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Fig. 3. ROC curve comparison for (a) training and (b) testing different supervised machine learning based IDS 
 
Table 10 Z-score values of Mc-Nemar’s Test for the supervised machine-learning algorithms used in the this study (the 
arrowheads ← ↑ denote which classifier performed better). The shaded ones that larger than 1.96 indicate statistically significant 
differences at the confidence level of 95% (p < 0.05). 
 NB DT AdaB RUSB LogitB Bagging RF KNN ELM NN SVM LDA 
NB -            
DT 86.2 ← -           
AdaB 88.2 ← 7.1 ↑ -          
RUSB 82.4 ← 19.2 ↑ 10.3 ↑ -         
LogitB 86.2 ← 16.5 ↑ 18.2 ↑ 4.3 ↑ -        
Bagging 84.4 ← 20.7 ↑ 22.1 ↑ 9.2 ↑ 6.4 ↑ -       
RF 75.0 ← 40.0 ↑ 35.7 ↑ 30.0 ↑ 25.2 ↑ 24.8 ↑ -      
KNN 78.1 ← 28.0 ↑ 23.8 ↑ 17.5 ↑ 13.9 ↑ 10.1 ↑ 12.3 ← -     
ELM 71.1 ← 42.6 ↑ 43.2 ↑ 38.6 ↑ 35.6 ↑ 33.5 ↑ 13.1 ↑ 29.3 ↑ -    
NN 64.4 ← 49.4. ↑ 47.6 ↑ 43.9 ↑ 39.0 ↑ 37.9 ↑ 24.1 ↑ 30.2 ↑ 13.7 ↑ -   
SVM 75.5 ← 25.1 ↑ 22.9 ↑ 15.7 ↑ 14.0 ↑ 10.5 ↑  4.6  ↑ 3.4 ↑ 17.4 ↑ 22.3 ↑ -  
LDA 58.5 ← 56..7 ↑ 54.9 ↑ 49.7 ↑ 50.7 ↑ 47.1 ↑ 33.8 ↑ 41.1 ↑ 26.6 ↑ 12.4 ↑ 36.0 ↑ - 
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For Mc Nemar’s test, the null hypothesis suggest that 
different classifiers perform similarly whereas the alternative 
hypothesis claims that at least one of the classifiers performs 
differently. As shown in Table 10, by looking at the z-score 
values of Mc Nemar’s Test, one can conclude that DT 
achieved significantly better results than the other classifiers 
where the alternative hypothesis was accepted with a 
confidence level more than 99.5%. KNN also performed 
better than RF. AdaBoost also performed better than the other 
algorithms except DT, with a confidence level more than 
99.5%. Bagging and boosting produced better results over 
other conventional machine learning methods such as KNN, 
ELM, NN, RF, SVM and LDA. 
 
In terms of execution time, as shown in Fig. 4(a), we notice 
that NB approach achieves the best results for the training 
task. We excluded KNN from Fig. 4(a) due to the fact that 
KNN has no training time, where this algorithm employs a 
distance function in order to predict the corresponding labels 
[20].  From Fig. 4(b), on the other hand, one can observe that 
ELM approach achieved the best testing time. Moreover, 
ELM has achieved an acceptable false alarm rate as shown in 
Table 7. Therefore, ELM and its improved hierarchical 
approach [21] can possibly be an efficient choice for SDNs.  
 
On the other hand, in spite of the good level of accuracy for 
the testing stage achieved by KNN approach, it showed the 
worst testing time, which may indicate that KNN algorithm 
is not the best choice for SDNs where each controller may 
need to handle thousands of flows per second. A possible 
solution to this problem can be achieved by reducing the 
number of the training instance by applying an appropriate 
sampling method. Finally, one can observe that DT has 
achieved the highest level of accuracy and a good testing time 
in compared with the other classifiers. 
 
 
(a) 
 
 
(b) 
 
Fig. 4. Execution time for (a) training and (b) testing different supervised machine learning method
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7. Conclusion 
In this paper, we provide a comparative study of 
choosing an efficient anomaly-based intrusion detection 
method for SDNs. We focused on supervised machine 
learning approaches by using the following classifiers: NN, 
LDA, DT, RF, Linear SVM, KNN, NB, ELM, AdaBoost,  
RUSBoost, LogitBoost and BaggingTrees. In addition, we 
used PCA method for feature selection and dimensionality 
reduction. Using NSL-KDD dataset and based on our 
extensive experimental study, we conclude that DT approach 
shows the best performance in terms of accuracy, precision, 
F1-measure, AUC and Mc Nemar’s Test. Also bagging and 
boosting approaches outperformed other conventional 
machine learning methods such as KNN, ELM, NN, RF, 
SVM and LDA with a confidence level more than 99.5%. 
Whereas in terms of false alarm rate and recall the best results 
achieved by LogitBoost. In terms of the execution time, ELM 
approach achieved the best testing time.  
It is worth noting that using PCA approach was very 
successful in enhancing the accuracy level from 77.09% to 
88.74% in compared with using the basic features provided 
by the SDN controller. Our future work will be focused on 
comparing the results obtained from this study with other 
machine learning approaches and exploring other flow-based 
features that could be used to achieve a higher level of 
accuracy with lower false alarm rate. 
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